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8AFTERWORD: EVIDENCE AND 
EXPERIMENT
Patricia Waugh
In styles that range from the performatively paratactic and experimental, to schol-arly sobriety and sharp sociocultural critique, these chapters engage issues concern-
ing the contemporary uses and forms of experiment and the building and distribution 
of kinds of evidence in relation to new concepts and practices of experimentation 
within the contemporary biomedical sciences. They explore some less obvious ways in 
which knowledges and practices forged in this new ‘megaphone’ science resonate far 
beyond conventional spaces of research and are deeply and reciprocally entangled with 
the embodied self-fashioning of individual selves and group identities.1 Everywhere, 
not only in postmodern theory or art, as Ian Hacking has reminded us, people are made 
up: but they are fashioned through highly refl exive and recursive knowledge-making 
practices deeply intertwined with and distributed across multiple agencies and cultural 
domains.2 In this response, I will consider key themes explored in these chapters by 
bringing to bear on the discussion some earlier conceptualisations of experiment and 
evidence that still powerfully shape our cultural assumptions and I will consider briefl y 
whether some further refl ection on experimentalism in the arts may also usefully bear 
on key interdisciplinary questions for a future critical medical humanities. 
Major shifts in the concepts, working practices and organisation of the biomedical 
sciences have prompted new ethnomethodological and conceptual work on experimen-
tal systems.3 From Quine’s concept of ‘webs of belief’ in which all knowledge sys-
tems are entangled, Hacking’s refl ections on representation and intervention, and the 
revival of interest in Ludwik Fleck’s early work on scientifi c ‘thought communities’, 
meta-refl ection on experiment in science has moved away from abstract post-positivist 
discussions of proof, to interest in the material-discursive organisation of knowledge 
systems.4 How do experimental systems generate and consolidate what comes to be 
regarded as ‘evidence’? Who are the agents and players, and what are the processes 
and instruments involved, their relations and their benefi ciaries? No longer imagined 
as narrowly controlled, experiment in biomedicine now appears exploratory and open, 
involving an array of instruments, models, data, media, procedures, tacit practices and 
recursive moves that collapse distinctions between theory and practice, inside and out-
side, instrument and experimental subject, researcher and researched. Its new epistemic 
objects seem ill fi tted to inherited epistemological categories. This new biosociality 
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opens up a plethora of critical challenges to the medical humanities, as well as unprec-
edented opportunities to negotiate new and exciting interdisciplinary entanglements.
Like the new natureculture of the post-genomic, epigenetic, the Anthropocene, 
neurobiological plasticity, distributed cognition and the digital humanities – key cul-
tural and scientifi c contexts shaping contemporary medical practices – these chapters 
refl exively highlight their own artefactual nature and conceptual entanglement with 
the objects of their exploration in a way that pre-empts and guards against prema-
ture closure. Biomedical science itself, of course, is constantly under the biocapitalist 
pressure of closure encapsulated in the idea of translational research. So a critical 
medical humanities has an investment in the open that is positionally more diffi cult 
to achieve in the biomedical contexts it analyses. Metaphors and concepts of com-
plexity, the network, recursivity, emergence, assemblage and refl exive embodiment 
central to systems biology – the fastest-growing area of the new genomic and post-
genomic sciences – are now providing explanations and organising devices across 
many varied domains of contemporary culture.5 But an important task for the medi-
cal humanities is to look at the many and different ways in which these concepts are 
assembled and put to practical uses. Just as informational concepts around life as 
a ‘script’ empowered the early development of molecular biology and genetics, in 
the new genomic biologies, the network, as a complex process of entanglement, is 
the organising trope slowly making redundant the concept of the gene as an entity.6 
How might the medical humanities fi nd appropriate, open and dynamic interdisci-
plinary models and procedures with which to begin to get a fi rmer – more detailed 
and nuanced – handle on these concepts, motifs and models of biosocial complexity 
that are now distributed through increasing numbers of knowledge systems? The bio-
medical sciences are being transformed by the post-genomic understanding of cellular 
processes and epigenetics that have required abandonment of classic unidirectional 
models of genetic determination that rested on a realist construction of causality and 
a reductionist understanding of method. How far do these new complexity discourses 
in the life and environmental sciences, which have challenged epistemologies and the 
understanding of experimental and evidentiary processes, require a reappraisal on the 
part of the humanities about its own assumptions concerning experiment and knowl-
edge? Several chapters note the need to fi nd ways to overcome the tedious legacies of 
former realism versus anti-realism disputes that, culminating in the Science Wars of 
the 1990s, also deterred early medical humanities work from proper engagement with 
cultural and critical theory. But things have moved on. The concept of artefactual 
realism explored in relation to the new systems sciences is ceasing to be dismissed as 
an oxymoron or a weaselly metaphor, but is now engaged through a variety of cog-
nate arguments from Barad’s ‘agential’ realism, Harding and Longino’s ‘standpoint’ 
realism, Dupré, Hacking and Cartwright’s ‘promiscuous’ realism, to the various post-
‘critical realisms’.7 All are seeking ways to overcome a situation where, if the sciences 
continue to refuse to relinquish the mystique of positivism, and the humanities refuse 
to continue to view science as a threat to empathy and human fl ourishing, the deep 
assumptions of ‘two cultures’ antagonisms will continue to sabotage or make diffi cult 
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any genuinely new interdisciplinary frameworks and enterprises. It is time to break 
out of models of respectful integration, as well as those of subaltern mimicry, but with 
a critical awareness of the diffi culties and challenges involved. 
For at the heart of the disciplinary distribution of facts and values that Bruno 
Latour has called the ‘modern settlement’ is an assumption, primarily the legacy of 
positivism, of the non-epistemic status of the humanities in relation to science that 
legitimates and requires what Fitzgerald and Callard here refer to as the ‘helpmeet’ 
model of the medical humanities. I would go even further and suggest that the fetishi-
sation of integration, albeit unintentionally, may ultimately serve to strengthen dis-
ciplinary foundationalisms that underpin assumptions of ‘ownership’ of particular 
domains of knowledge and practice; the desideratum of integration may insidiously 
preserve the knowledge hierarchies of the positivist legacy. The chapters gathered here, 
casuistically, theoretically, performatively, challenge models of integration, mimesis, 
generalisability and assumptions that true knowledge is simply refl ective or corre-
spondent. Refusing but recognising the lingering presence of disciplinary fact/value 
dualisms that position the humanities outside the fully epistemological, they also sug-
gest that future challenges to the positivist legacy must extend beyond the favourite 
topoi of the medical humanities, such as the clinical encounter, that lend themselves 
to phenomenological analysis, the affective, the dialogic and the narrative. In preserv-
ing stereotypes of the appropriate strengths of the humanities, this narrowing of its 
appropriate domains and methodologies allows the perception of science as sole guar-
antor of properly evidenced knowledge to persist. A critical humanities that disrupts 
the processes that encourage such perceptions is not a new postmodernism in sheep’s 
clothing; in no way are the expertise, effi cacy and validity of science devalued. But 
exploration of the artefactual, of the role of technologies, processes of dissemination, 
instruments, in the assembling of biomedical knowledge reveals how there is no area 
that is not entangled with processes of observation and measurement. Exposure to 
alternative agencies, users, perspectives can produce not only different but equally 
valid kinds of knowledges, but also radically new epistemic objects. All seven of these 
chapters therefore call for a level playing fi eld where knowledge is shared, assembled, 
distributed and entangled, but with different infl ections that produce new epistemic 
objects, across the arts and the sciences. What is challenged is the model of interdisci-
plinarity that envisages pre-packaged individual disciplines retaining and contributing 
their particular strengths in constrained and appropriate spaces and simply refram-
ing epistemic objects already securely positioned in other specifi c disciplines. What is 
called for instead is recognition of the necessary vagueness and fuzziness of the epis-
temic object as it is displaced from disciplinary ownership to enter a place of experi-
mental exploration that may bring forth something new and radically different. Like 
high-energy physicists assembling the myriad differential traces left as various sensitive 
instruments move over the invisible surfaces of entities only observable through the 
effects of the instruments, new epistemic objects may also emerge whose identities 
are entirely a product of the experimental process. In this model of experiment and 
knowledge-making, the ‘modern settlement’ is completely unsettled.
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But positivist assumptions die hard. For what is etymologically and, one might 
argue, ideologically at their core, is the concept of positum – to lay out – as if data col-
lection and its processing through formal testing and rules of reasoning constitute the 
only method that can deliver proper and ‘truthful’ evidence of the world’s structures 
and forms. In rigid or unrefl ective modes of positivism, the necessarily insuffi cient 
determination of any theory by data, or the existence of tacit assumptions that still 
underpin even the most rigorously ‘purifi ed’ theory construction, or the entanglement 
with artefactual processes, are seen to have minimal bearing on what emerges as 
‘knowledge’ of the world. Medicine’s continuing adherence to this model is refl ected 
in the modes of defence of Evidence-Based Medicine of the 1990s.8 Though tempered 
with the humanistic and Hippocratic in clinical practice, disease is still regarded as 
an entity that is available for knowledge through a structured hierarchy of inquiry 
that runs from the gold standard of the randomised controlled clinical trial (RCT) 
all the way down to patient narratives and testimonies. So methodological scepti-
cism is regarded as the appropriate epistemological stance for the researcher or cli-
nician; a more radical scepticism that insists on the indeterminism of knowledge is 
ruled out of court as denying the possibility of accurate and stable evidence. The fi rst 
experimental textbook, written by Claude Bernard in 1865, established the idea of 
controlled observation and testing through the use of manipulated models that might 
stand as proxies for natural objects and organisms outside the experimental system.9 
The nineteenth-century literary portrayal of the Promethean scientist – from Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein to H. G. Wells’s Dr Moreau – builds on the recognition of how 
the model confers on the scientist God-like powers to legislate for, manipulate and 
alter nature. But such assumptions underpin too E. O. Wilson’s arguments for a ‘con-
silience’ between the sciences and the arts and humanities.10 Like earlier arguments 
of the logical positivist unity of science movement of the 1930s, Wilson’s version of 
integration – consilience – is built on the assumption of a mutual acceptance by the 
humanities and the sciences of a hierarchy of knowledge whose foundation lies in 
the fundamental building blocks of ‘life’, whose discovery is the work of science. His 
pronouncement that ‘the genes have culture on a leash’ is shorthand for an entire 
onto-epistemology.11 But the operative concept holding all of this together, from early 
microbiology on, is the belief in the unity of life that legitimates the model’s authority 
as proxy and source of generalisable evidence. Though the era of Big Data has seemed 
to privilege the statistical analysis of trends and correlations despite the fallibility of 
statistical frequencies, the idea of the experiment comes with a weight of positivist 
baggage trailing in its wake: the belief that it carries the most secure evidence, the 
explanation of the causal mechanisms of disease. 
Positivism chooses to overlook the fact that theories never compare directly with 
models and that models never compare directly with empirical reality, for each is 
mutually entangled in the generation of the other and dependent on the nature of the 
experimental set-up.12 Thomas Kuhn was the fi rst philosopher of science to analyse 
the function of the model as the basic representative unit in science and to recognise 
its manipulation as an artefactual process producing a simulacrum entangled with and 
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in the world and therefore changing and having effects on it, rather than constituting 
the world’s accurate and comprehensive representation of it.13 This is true whether the 
model is regarded as a synecdoche representing a cut from nature or an analogue of its 
underlying processes. But as Carusi’s chapter explores, contemporary systems biology 
makes unavoidable the way that the experimental space and the epistemic objects that 
emerge from it are specifi cally entangled, distributed, fragile, unstable and unpredict-
able. One might suggest, indeed, that the processes and objects described seem to have 
more in common with those of the experimental arts than those of positivist models 
in science. An interesting challenge for the new critical medical humanities might be 
to begin to fi nd more ways to explore entanglements and overlappings of different 
models of experimental space across the sciences and humanities as part of a process 
of challenging the widespread assumption that only the resolutely scientifi c space is 
the producer of hard ‘evidence’. Already the work on experimental practices examined 
above is exposing fl aws in conventional views of scientifi c experiment, such as the 
dependence of the concept of the model as proxy on unwarranted beliefs in the unity 
and structural stability of living processes. From this perspective, from the molecular 
to the molar, all living nature, at every level of scale, would need to begin and remain 
essentially carved at the joints. Few would accept this assertion in bald terms and yet 
it underpins the classic idea of the scientifi c experiment that is still a powerful cul-
tural imaginary; we need more interdisciplinary experiments with and on other kinds 
of experiments to expose the limitations, blindnesses and particularities of different 
experimental systems. 
In the divvying up of the domains of art, science and morality that is the focus of 
Kant’s three great Critiques, the function of the model that is a work of art is con-
ceded to be important in allowing humans to bridge the gap between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal, bringing into existence, through the created imaginary world, the 
means to glimpse what might exist beyond the limits of the epistemologically known 
and which has, as yet, no determinable conceptual existence.14 In this view, however, 
although art might imagine possibility, only science can offer probabilities close to 
truths concerning nature’s actual processes. But this is a view of the separation of 
art and science now fundamentally challenged in the examination of the knowledge-
making procedures of the new biosciences undertaken in these chapters. Models 
themselves now challenge what we agree is ‘biologically real’. Models are no longer 
exclusively the specially bred denizens of the wetlab (such as mice, rats, macaques, E. 
coli and the tobacco mosaic virus); they are also mathematical, statistical and com-
putational assemblages involving multiple symbol systems and media, and requiring 
new visual display technologies and systems that can more readily suggest the three-
dimensional interconnectedness of complex systems than the conventional written 
scientifi c report or graphic tables and charts. The more distributed and complex pro-
cesses of the modern laboratory – that might now involve numerous sites, thousands 
of scientists and multiple kinds of equipment, modelling and display – make it almost 
impossible to ignore the artefactual in the assembling of what is regarded as evi-
dence, just as it becomes impossible to lay out a precise relation between the symbolic 
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import of the model and the set of conditions for which the model purports to stand 
or to bring into existence. 
In art, experiment has always been conceived in this way as exploratory, unpredict-
able, emergent and world-directed rather than mimetic.15 Art is mostly defended as an 
expression of the singularity of individuals’ experiences and history; only science deals 
in the universal and the directly generalisable. John Cage describes as experimental 
in music that which is indeterminate in outcome, for it includes and anticipates the 
listener as a co-participant in creating an emergent and therefore unpredictable mean-
ing.16 For the aesthetic theorist, Theodor Adorno, the motivation for experiment is 
provided ‘when impulse can no longer fi nd pre-established security in forms or con-
tent’.17 Experimental art sets out to defamiliarise the world and lay bare its artefac-
tual processes, but the new experimental processes in the contemporary biosciences 
also break up outmoded concepts that obscure rather than illuminate the world as 
they reify assumptions about nature as given, rather than recognising its artefactuality 
through multiple systems of experimental knowing. Experiment in the new biomedical 
sciences, like those of high-energy physics, also now acknowledges the fi nal indeter-
minism of objects, their dynamic, recursive and decentred complexity and entangle-
ment with their experimental systems. If one task for the critical medical humanities 
is to make more transparent those artefactual processes elided in order to render ‘evi-
dence’ incontrovertible, and to explore its human effects, another is to fi nd ways to 
share in and contribute its own multi-disciplinary experimental systems knowledge in 
the multi-modal and multi-media shaping of new intra-disciplinary epistemic objects.
This might include too thinking in new ways about historical experimentation, as 
in Scheid’s fascinating chapter on the entanglement of a variety of historical webs of 
belief, from holism and traditional medicine to dialectical materialism, in the fashion-
ing of biomedical systems science in contemporary China.18 Literary texts also provide 
rich sources for rethinking the production of knowledge. George Eliot’s famous image 
of the pier-glass (in her most scientifi cally engaged novel, Middlemarch, of 1874), 
whose rays illuminate a pattern of scratches on a surface of polished steel, has been 
read as a moral parable about egotistical blindness.19 It might now be interpreted as 
a refl ection on modelling and complexity and the artefactual building of knowledge. 
That her partner was G. H. Lewes, who was the fi rst to describe, in 1874, the year 
of the novel’s publication, emergence as the key mechanism of complex systems that 
seem to resist positivist reductionism, makes this interpretation even more plausible.20 
There is a great deal of hype and hope around the post-genomic, though it is unde-
niable that the molar clinical gaze is now thoroughly entangled with the molecular; 
we think of ourselves increasingly as complex and intertwined. But a critical medical 
humanities also has work to do in exploring irresponsible and dangerous over-extrap-
olations of these new concepts of complexity and entanglement, and their embedding 
in specifi c contexts of biosociality. The kinds of analysis offered in the chapters by 
Viney and Rehmann-Sutter and Mahr suggest how the fl attened agential hierarchies 
in theories of assemblage such as Actor Network Theory, for example, might use-
fully be reframed critically through historical work on earlier moments when hype 
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around new epistemological systems in biology licensed the objectifi cation of people 
by other people as ‘things’, experimental models or data sources, with horrendous 
consequences.21 Any metaphor or analogy that enables new ways of knowing inevita-
bly obscures others and may indeed build unwarranted ontological assumptions on the 
back of its epistemological embeddings. Post-genomic techniques in systems biology 
were enabled by concepts and metaphors from cybernetics and then developed further 
with the appearance of the World Wide Web. But complexity and entanglement can 
become catch-all terms that rewrite the world in their own image, just as the central 
dogma of Crick and Watson turned the genome into a script-writing service for life. 
The new concepts of complexity and entanglement are everywhere and no more so 
than at the heart of the creation of a new risk culture with its centralised mechanisms 
for controlling risk and enhancing security. Complexity is a double-edged tool allow-
ing systems biologies to escape charges of reductionism whilst enabling an extension 
of their reach, legitimised as ‘science’, to ever more domains of the lifeworld. In being 
critical, the medical humanities will need to be dynamic, experimental and riskier than 
this; in being entangled, it will need to be watchfully entangled. It will need to be one 
step ahead, even of this latest game in town.22
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